




Working Paper No. 196 










1  Introduction............................................................................................................... 1 
2  Progress of international capital adequacy norms ................................................ 2 
3  Capital adequacy standard in India........................................................................ 4 
4  Implementation of Basel II: the Indian status........................................................ 9 
5  Observations and Concluding Remarks............................................................... 15 






List of Tables 
 
 
Table 1: Distribution of Indian banks by CRAR (1996-2006)...................................... 8 
Table 2: Average CRAR level of Indian banking groups ............................................. 8 





List of Appendix 
 
 
Table A 1: Risk weights of asset categories under Basel I.......................................... 20 
Table A 2: RBI's Risk-weights for SA of Basel II: Claims on Indian Entities.......... 21 
Table A 3: RBI’s Risk-weights for SA of Basel II: Claims on Foreign Entities........ 22 
Table A 4: Priority sector lending by Scheduled Commercial Banks (SCB)............ 22 
 
 






Capital adequacy standards form an integral part of prudential banking sector 
regulation. Capital standards all over the world are converging at the behest of the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision towards the so called Basel II norms. This paper 
elaborates on the Indian experience.   
 
India will be implementing the Basel II norms, from March 2008. It is thus worthwhile to 
take a look at the current scenario and examine the challenges and long term implications 
of moving towards the new regime.  This paper first elaborates the present state of capital 
adequacy standards in India and then goes on to discuss several related issues and 
challenges.  In doing so it provides an interesting account of India’s experience with 
Basel I and a perspective to the several issues in relation to Basel II.   
 
This study is a part of ICRIER’s Financial Sector Research Programme (FSRP), a 
programme focused on major research issues pertaining to India’s financial sector.  FSRP 
was launched in September 2006 and presently focusing on four issues viz. financial 
inclusion in India, constraints to SME financing, role of monetary authority in a 
liberalising financial system and management of public debt. As part of FSRP, ICRIER 
has also established a monthly Financial Sector Seminar Series since October 2006. 
Among those who have addressed the monthly seminar include leading national and 
international experts.  
 
I take this opportunity to invite research proposals on financial sector issues under the 
FSRP. I would like to reiterate ICRIER’s preference for collaborative work, as reflected 
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In this paper we present an analytical review of the capital adequacy regime and the 
present state of capital to risk-weighted asset ratio (CRAR) of the banking sector in India.  
In the current regime of Basel I, Indian banking system is performing reasonably well, 
with an average CRAR of about 12 per cent, which is higher than the internationally 
accepted level of 8 per cent as well as India’s own minimum regulatory requirement of 9 
per cent.  As the revised capital adequacy norms, Basel II, are being implemented from 
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In its report submitted to the Government of India in December 1991, the Narasimhan 
Committee on Financial System suggested several reform measures for India’s financial 
system.  The Committee recommended gradual liberalization of the banking sector by 
adopting measures such as reduction of statutory preemptions, deregulation of interest 
rates and allowing foreign and domestic private banks to enter the system.  Along with 
these, the Committee also recommended adoption of prudential regulation relating to 
capital adequacy, income recognition, asset classification and provisioning standards.   
While the liberalization was aimed at bringing about competition and efficiency into 
India’s banking system, the prudential regulation was aimed at strengthening the 
supervisory system, which is important in the process of liberalization.   
 
In this paper we focus on one particular prudential regulation, i.e. capital adequacy 
requirement in the banking sector in India.  Capital adequacy is an indicator of the 
financial health of the banking system.  It is measured by the Capital to Risk-weighted 
Asset Ratio (CRAR)
1, defined as the ratio of a bank’s capital to its total risk-weighted 
assets.  Financial regulators generally impose a capital adequacy norm on their banking 
and financial systems in order to provide for a buffer to absorb unforeseen losses due to 
risky investments.  A well adhered to capital adequacy regime does play an important 
role in minimizing the cascading effects of banking and financial sector crises. 
 
The Narasimhan Committee endorsed the internationally accepted norms for capital 
adequacy standards, developed by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
(BCBS).
2  BCBS initiated Basel I norms in 1988, considered to be the first move towards 
risk-weighted capital adequacy norms.  In 1996 BCBS amended the Basel I norms and in 
1999 it initiated a complete revision of the Basel I framework, to be known as Basel II.  
In pursuance of the Narasimhan Committee recommendations, India adopted Basel I 
norms for commercial banks in 1992, the market risk amendment of Basel I in 1996 and 
has committed to implement the revised norms, the Basel II, from March 2008. 
 
In this paper we present an analytical review of the current capital adequacy norms in 
India’s banking system vis-à-vis the Basel framework.  This paper also attempts to 
examine issues and challenges with regard to the implementation of CRAR norms under 
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Basel II regime in India.  The paper tries to identify limitations, gaps and inadequacies in 
the Indian banking system which may hamper the realization of the potential benefits of 
the new regime.  In other words, the paper attempts to examine whether the costs 
imposed by implementing the new regime will be adequately compensated by an 
improvement in the system.   
 
While the literature on Basel framework is burgeoning, studies particularly dealing with 
India are limited.
3  This paper attempts to fill the gap.  First we discuss in brief Basel I, 
market risk amendment of Basel I and Basel II.  Then we present the current state of 
affairs with respect to capital adequacy ratio in India.  Finally we discuss a few issues and 
emerging challenges for the Indian banking system in the wake of Basel II. 
 
2  Progress of international capital adequacy norms 
 
The international financial community has witnessed several significant developments in 
the area of risk management and banking supervision over the last two decades.  In 1988, 
BCBS introduced risk-based capital adequacy norms through Basel I accord (BCBS 
1988).  Basel I mainly incorporated credit risk in calculating the capital adequacy norms 
of banks.  It recommended a bank’s regulatory capital at 8 per cent of its risk-weighted 
asset, where assets were risk-weighted according to their credit risk.  In 1996, an 
amendment was made to Basel I to incorporate market risk in addition to credit risk in the 
weighing scheme (BCBS 1996).  In July 1999, BCBS initiated the process of replacing 
the current framework with a revised version, the Basel II.  After several rounds of 
discussions, consultations and deliberations within the global financial and banking 
institutions, Basel II has evolved as a revised and comprehensive framework for 
prudential regulations to replace the current Basel I framework. 
  
In 2007, more than 100 countries are following Basel I norms.
4  As far as Basel II is 
concerned, a survey by Financial Stability Institute (FSI) of the Bank for International 
Settlement in 2006 revealed that 95 countries intended to adopt Basel II, in some form or 
the other, by 2015.  Out of these countries, the 13 BCBS member countries have initiated 
Basel II implementation process in 2007.  
 
An overview of Basel I, market risk amendment of Basel I and Basel II 
 
Basel I:  Basel I is a framework for calculating ‘Capital to Risk-weighted Asset Ratio’ 
(CRAR).  It defines a bank’s capital as two types: core (or tier I) capital comprising 
equity capital and disclosed reserves; and supplementary (or tier II) capital comprising  
items such as undisclosed reserves, revaluation reserves, general provisions/general loan-
                                                 
3 Some studies that have addressed certain specific issues of Basel II from an Indian perspective are Ghosh 
and Nachane (2003), Nitsure (2005), Nachane et al. (2006). 
4  The Basel norms are voluntary and legally non-binding on all countries, including the 13 member 
countries of BCBS.  However, studies have identified that the simplicity of the Basel I norms and IMF’s 
Financial Sector Assessment Programme that emphasizes compliance of Basel I norms could be two 
important factors that have led to more than 100 countries adopting the Basel I norms (Bailey 2005, 
Reddy 2006).    3
loss reserves, hybrid debt capital instruments and subordinated term debt.  Under Basel I, 
at least 50 per cent of a bank’s capital base should consist of core capital.  In order to 
calculate CRAR, the bank’s assets should be weighted by five categories of credit risk – 
0, 10, 20, 50 and 100 per cent.  For example, if an asset is in the form of cash or claims 
on central governments, it will get a risk weight of zero, if it is in the form of a claim on 
domestic public sector entities, then it will get a risk weight of 10, 20 or 50 per cent at the 
discretion of the national supervisory authority.  Claims on the private sector will get a 
risk weight of 100 per cent.  Table A1 in the Appendix provides the risk weights for 
different asset classes under Basel I. 
 
Market risk amendment: In 1996, an amendment was made to Basel I to incorporate 
market risk, in addition to credit risk, in the calculation of CRAR.  To measure market 
risk, banks were given the choice of two options:
5 
 
1.  A standardized approach using a building block methodology 
 
2.  An ‘in-house’ approach allowing banks to develop their own proprietary models 
to calculate capital charge for market risk by using the notion of Value-at-Risk 
(VaR). 
 
These approaches, however, calculated the capital charges for market risk and not the 
risk-weighted asset.  Therefore, this measure of capital charges would have to be 
multiplied by a factor 12.5 (reciprocal of 8 per cent, the minimum regulatory capital 
adequacy ratio) and then added to the risk-weighted assets computed for credit risk.  In 
the calculation of CRAR, the numerator will be the sum of the bank’s tier I and tier II 
capital (tier II capital should be limited to a maximum of 100 per cent of tier I capital), 
plus a tier III capital introduced in the 1996 amendment to support market risk.   
 
Basel II: Basel II is a much more comprehensive framework of banking supervision.  It 
not only deals with CRAR calculation, but has also got provisions for supervisory review 
and market discipline.  Thus, Basel II stands on three pillars:  
 
1.  Minimum regulatory capital (Pillar 1):  This is a revised and extensive 
framework for capital adequacy standards, where CRAR is calculated by 
incorporating credit, market and operational risks. 
 
2.  Supervisory review (Pillar 2):  This provides key principles for supervisory 
review, risk management guidance and supervisory transparency and 
accountability. 
 
3.  Market discipline (Pillar 3):  This pillar encourages market discipline by 
developing a set of disclosure requirements that will allow market participants to 
assess key pieces of information on risk exposure, risk assessment process and 
capital adequacy of a bank.    
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Minimum Regulatory Capital under Basel II 
 
Under Basel II, CRAR is calculated by taking into account three types of risks: credit 
risk, market risk and operational risk.  The approaches for each one of these risks is 
described below. 
 
Credit risk:  There are two approaches for credit risk, viz., the Standardized Approach 
(SA) and the Internal Ratings Based (IRB) approach.  In SA, credit risk is measured in 
the same manner as in Basel I, but in a more risk sensitive manner, i.e. by linking credit 
ratings of credit rating agencies to risk of the assets of the bank.  This, according to 
BCBS, is an improvement over Basel I, where categorization of the assets into five risk-
weight categories was an ad hoc categorization.  BCBS has provided an example of how 
risk weights can be linked with the credit ratings.  The responsibility of providing the 
risk-weights corresponding to various assets, under SA, lies with the supervisory 
authority of a country.  As far as the IRB approach is concerned, banks will be allowed to 
use their internal estimates of credit risk, subject to supervisory approval, to determine 
the capital charge for a given exposure.  This would involve estimation of several 
parameters such as the probability of default (PD), loss given default (LGD), exposure at 
default (EAD) and effective maturity (M) corresponding to a particular debt portfolio.   
 
Market risk: As far as market risk is concerned, Basel II retains the recommendations of 
the 1996 Amendment. 
  
Operational risk:  Basel II has introduced a new kind of risk, called the ‘operational risk’ 
in calculating CRAR.  It is defined as “the risk of direct or indirect loss resulting from 
inadequate or failed internal processes, people and systems or from external events.” In 
order to calculate the capital charges for operational risk, three approaches – Basic 
Indicator Approach (BIA), Standardized Approach (SA) and Advanced Measurement 
Approaches (AMA) – have been suggested.  In the BIA, an estimate of the capital charge 
for operational risk is provided by averaging over a fixed percentage of positive annual 
gross income of the bank over the previous three years.
6   In this estimate, negative 
incomes are excluded.  Under SA, at first the bank’s business activities are divided into 
eight business lines.  For each business line, a capital charge is calculated by multiplying 
the gross income of the business line by a factor.
7 A capital charge for each business line 
is thus calculated for three consecutive years.  The overall capital charge is calculated as 
the three-year average of the simple summation of the charges across business lines in 
each year.  Under AMA, a bank can, subject to supervisory approval, use its own 
mechanism for determining capital requirement for operational risk.   
 
3  Capital adequacy standard in India 
In India, at present, there is a ‘three track’ approach for Basel compliance – the 
commercial banks are Basel I compliant with respect to credit and market risks; the urban 
                                                 
6 This has been currently fixed at 15 per cent.   
7 This factor is called the β factor, and pre-fixed by BCBS for each business line.  For more, refer to BCBS 
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cooperative banks maintain capital for credit risk as per Basel I and market risk through 
surrogate charges; and the rural banks have capital adequacy norms that are not on par 
with the Basel norms (Leeladhar 2006, Reddy 2006).  The three track approach is 
justified by the necessity to maintain varying degree of stringency across different types 
of banks in India reflecting different levels of operational complexity and risk appetite.  
The three track approach is also justified in order to ensure greater financial inclusion and 
for an efficient credit delivery mechanism (Reddy 2006).   
 
India adopted Basel I norms for scheduled commercial banks in April 1992, and its 
implementation was spread over the next three years.  It was stipulated that foreign banks 
operating in India should achieve a CRAR of 8 per cent by March 1993 while Indian 
banks with branches abroad should achieve the 8 per cent norm by March 1995.  All 
other banks were to achieve a capital adequacy norm of 4 per cent by March 1993 and the 
8 per cent norm by March 1996.
8 
 
In its mid-term review of Monetary and Credit Policy in October 1998, the Reserve Bank 
of India (RBI) raised the minimum regulatory CRAR requirement to 9 per cent, and 
banks were advised to achieve this 9 per cent CRAR level by March 31, 2000.
9  Thus, the 
capital adequacy norm for India’s commercial banks is higher than the internationally 
accepted level of 8 per cent.
10   
 
The RBI responded to the market risk amendment of Basel I in 1996 by initially 
prescribing various surrogate capital charges such as investment fluctuation reserve of 5 
per cent of the bank’s portfolio and a 2.5 per cent risk weight on the entire portfolio for 
these risks between 2000 and 2002.  These were later replaced with VaR-based capital 
charges, as required by the market risk amendments, which became effective from March 
2005.  India has gone a step ahead of Basel I in that the banks in India are required to 
maintain capital charges for market risk on their ‘available for sale’ portfolios as well as 
on their ‘held for trading portfolios’ from March 2006 while Basel I requires market risk 
charges for trading portfolios only.   
 
The RBI has announced the implementation of Basel II norms in India for internationally 
active banks from March 2008 and for the domestic commercial banks from March 2009.  
Before we go into details of several issues facing the banking industry in India in the 
wake of Basel II, we briefly describe the current state of affairs with respect to capital 
adequacy of India’s banking industry.   
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Government of India contributed Rs. 5,700 crore as equity to recapitalize nationalised banks during 
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9 This was done following the recommendation of the Narasimhan Committee on Banking Sector Reforms, 
also known as the Second Narasimhan Committee which submitted its report in April 1998. 
10 Many other countries have also prescribed a higher capital adequacy norm.  For example, the capital 
adequacy norm is 8.5 per cent in Thailand, 9 per cent in Bangladesh, 10 per cent in South Africa and Sri 
Lanka, 11 per cent in Brazil, 12 per cent in Singapore.  In China the minimum requirement is 8 per cent.    6
The present state of capital standards for commercial banks in India 
 
The scheduled commercial banks in India are categorized into the following groups:   
nationalised banks, other public sector banks, State Bank of India (SBI) group, Indian 
private banks (further categorized as old private banks and new private banks) and 
foreign banks.  Sometimes the first two categories are clubbed together as there is only 
one bank in the category ‘other public sector bank’, the Industrial Development Bank of 
India (IDBI) bank.  The first three categories are commonly known as public sector 
banks.  At the end of March 2006, there were altogether 84 banks operating in India, 
consisting of 20 nationalised banks (including IDBI bank), 8 banks in SBI group, 19 old 
private banks, 8 new private banks and 29 foreign banks.  The ratio of total assets of the 
commercial banks to the GDP of India stood at 86.9 per cent at end-March 2006.  At the 
end of March 2006, the share of public sector banks in the total banking assets of the 
country stood at 72.3 per cent.
11  Old and new private banks together constituted about 20 
per cent, while foreign banks accounted for 7.2 per cent of the total banking assets of 
India in March 2006.   
 
Table 1 provides yearly frequency distribution of different bank groups by their CRAR 
levels for the period 1996-2006.  As shown in the table, by the end of March 1997, all but 
2 nationalised banks and 4 private banks were short of meeting the capital adequacy 
norm.  The SBI group and the foreign banks had achieved the minimum regulatory norm 
by March 1997.  Although a few banks were having negative CRAR during 2000-02, all 
banks achieved the minimum regulatory level by 2006.  As shown in Table 1, majority of 
the banks in all bank categories have achieved a CRAR level of more than 10 per cent by 
March 2006, indicating good financial health of the banking industry, in terms of capital 
adequacy norms, over the recent years. 
 
The average level of CRAR for the Indian banking groups for the period 1999-2006 is 
presented in Table 2.  As shown by this table, the average CRAR level for the banking 
industry has stood consistently between 11 and 12 per cent during 1999-2006, which is 
much higher than the current minimum regulatory requirement of 9 per cent and the 
international minimum requirement of 8 per cent.   
 
As seen from Table 2, overall CRAR for the banking system has marginally declined 
since 2005.  Between 2004 and 2005, the overall CRAR declined by 0.1 percentage 
points and between 2005 and 2006, this decline was by 0.5 percentage points.  Bank 
group wise, between 2004 and 2005, ‘old private banks’ recorded the highest decline of 
1.2 percentage points in CRAR followed by a 1 percentage point fall for SBI group and 
the foreign bank group each.  The ‘new Private Banks’ recorded a rise of 1.9 percentage 
points in CRAR and the nationalised banks recorded a rise of 0.1 percentage points.  The 
net result was a marginal decline in CRAR for the banking system as a whole.  RBI 
attributed this decline to the increase in total risk-weighted assets relative to the capital, 
for the first time since March 2000 (RBI 2005b).  The increase in risk-weighted assets 
was due to a higher growth in the loan portfolio of banks and higher risk weights made 
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applicable for housing loans, the most rapidly increasing component of retail loans for 
banks.
12   
 
Following a similar pattern, CRAR levels for all but one banking group recorded a 
decline between 2005 and 2006.  The highest decline of 1 percentage point was observed 
for ‘foreign banks’, followed by a decline by 0.8 percentage points for ‘nationalised’ and 
‘old private banks’, of 0.7 percentage points for ‘other public sector bank’ (IDBI being 
the sole member of this group) and a decline by 0.5 percentage points for the SBI group.  
During this period ‘new private banks’ showed a rise of 0.5 percentage point in CRAR.  
The resultant change in CRAR for the banking system as a whole was a decline of 0.5 
percentage points.  This overall decline in CRAR could be attributed to three factors – (i) 
higher growth in loan portfolio of banks as compared to investment in government 
securities, (ii) increase in risk weights for personal loans, real estate and capital market 
exposure, and (iii) application of VaR-based capital charge for market risk for investment 
held under ‘held for trade’ and ‘available for sale’ portfolios (RBI 2006).
13    
 
Notwithstanding the overall decline in CRAR recorded successively for the last two 
years, the CRAR level remains at a satisfactory level of 12.3 per cent at the end of March 
2006.  As far as the individual banking groups are concerned, IDBI bank (the sole 
member of the group ‘other public sector banks’) had the highest CRAR at 14.8 per cent 
at the end of March 2006, followed by the foreign banks with a CRAR level of 13 per 
cent, the new domestic private banks with 12.6 per cent and the nationalised banks at 
12.4 per cent at the same period.  At the end of March 2006, the SBI group has an 
average CRAR of 11.9 per cent and the old domestic private banks have an average 




Table 3 provides a comparative picture of the capital adequacy ratios of different 
countries vis-à-vis India’s.  As shown by this table, CRAR of Indian banking system 
compares well with many emerging countries such as Korea, Malaysia and South Africa.  
Countries such as Brazil, Indonesia, Hong Kong, Singapore and Thailand have higher 
CRAR level than India in 2005 while Japan, Taiwan, the United States and the 
neighbouring countries of Bangladesh and Sri Lanka have lower CRAR levels than India.  
In 2005, China’s banking system had a CRAR level of less than 8 per cent.  According to 
the official website of the Chinese Government, 74 per cent of China’s total banking 
asset could meet the 8 per cent level in 2006, compared with 0.56 per cent in 2003 when 
only eight banks complied.
14  Thus, when compared with China, India is at a much better 
position with respect to capital adequacy.  
 
                                                 
12 The core capital for the banks during this period increased from 8.1 per cent in 2004 to 8.5 per cent in 
2005 since some banks raised capital from the capital market at substantial premium (RBI 2005b).   
13 Although the overall CRAR declined, the core capital during the period 2005-06 increased from 8.4 per 
cent to 9.3 per cent due to increased access by banks to primary capital market and also due to transfer of 
IFR from tier II to tier I capital (RBI 2006).   
14 Chinese Government’s official website: http://www.gov.cn/english/2006-11/24/content_45314.htm.   8
Table 1: Distribution of Indian banks by CRAR (1996-2006) 
(Unit: Nos.) 









Year  Nationalized banks 
2) SBI  group 
1996-97  2   -   6  11   -   -   3  5 
1997-98  1   -   6  12   -   -   1  7 
1998-99  1   -   4  14   -   -    -   8 
1999-00  1   -   4  14   -    -    -   8 
2000-01  1*  1  2  15   -    -    -   8 
2001-02  1  1  2  15   -    -    -   8 
2002-03   -    -   1  18   -    -    -   8 
2003-04   -    -   1  18   -    -    -   8 
2004-05   -    -   2  18   -    -    -   8 
2005-06   -    -    -   20   -    -    -   8 
Year  Indian private banks (old and new) Foreign banks 
1996-97  3  1  8  22   -    -   14  24 
1997-98  2  2  8  22   -    -   12  30 
1998-99  2  2  5  25  1   -   14  29 
1999-00  2  2  3  25   -    -   5  37 
2000-01  2*  1  5  23   -    -   4  38 
2001-02  1*  1  3  25  1*   -   2  37 
2002-03  2   -   3  25   -    -    -   36 
2003-04  1  1  -  28   -    -    -   33 
2004-05  1  1  5  22   -    -   1  30 
2005-06  2   -   2  23   -     -   2  27 
Note:  1)  MRR is Minimum Regulatory Requirement (8% till 1998-99, 9% thereafter) 
  2)  Nationalised banks Include IDBI Bank from 2004-05. 
  3)  - indicates nil, * indicates negative 
Source: RBI, Reports on Trend and Progress of Banking in India, various issues 
 
 























1999  10.6  12.3 n.a. 12.1 11.8 10.8 11.3 
2000  10.1  11.6 n.a. 12.4 13.4 11.9 11.1 
2001  10.2  12.7 n.a. 11.9 11.5 12.6 11.4 
2002  10.9  13.3 n.a. 12.5 12.3 12.9  12 
2003  12.2  13.4 n.a. 12.8 11.3 15.2 12.7 
2004  13.1  13.4 n.a. 13.7 10.2  15  12.9 
2005  13.2  12.4  15.51  12.5  12.1 14 12.8 
2006  12.4  11.9 14.8 11.7 12.6  13  12.3 
Note: n.a. implies not available 
Source: RBI, Report on Trend and Progress of Banking in India, 2005-06   9
Table 3: CRAR level in select countries 
(unit: %) 
Country 2005  2006 
Bangladesh 7.3     
Brazil 18.1     
China  < 8    
Hong Kong  14.9  15.2 
India 12.8  12.3 
Indonesia 19.5     
Japan 8.9     
Korea 13  13.1 
Malaysia 13.6  12.8 
Singapore 15.8  15.4 
South Africa  13.3    
Sri Lanka  10.8  11.5 
Taiwan 10.3  10.3 
Thailand 14.2  14.7 
US 10.3     
Source: Central Bank websites 
 
4  Implementation of Basel II: the Indian status 
 
The RBI announced in May 2004 that banks in India should examine the options 
available under Basel II for revised capital adequacy framework.  In February 2005, RBI 
issued the first draft guidelines on Basel II implementations in which an initial target date 
for Basel II compliance was set for March 2007 for all commercial banks, excluding 
Local Area Banks (LABs) and Regional Rural Banks (RRBs).  This deadline was, 
however, postponed to March 2008 for internationally active banks and March 2009 for 
domestic commercial banks in RBI’s mid-year policy announcement of October 30, 
2006.  Although RBI and the commercial banks have been preparing for the revised 
capital adequacy framework since RBI’s first intimidation on Basel II compliance, the 
complexity and intense data requirement of Basel II have brought about several 
challenges in its implementation.  Given the limited preparation of the banking system for 
Basel II implementation, this postponement is not surprising.   
 
The final RBI guidelines on Basel II implementation were released on April 27, 2007.
15  
According to these guidelines, banks in India will initially adopt SA for credit risk and 
BIA for operational risk.  RBI has provided the specifics of these approaches in its 
guidelines.  After adequate skills are developed, both by banks and RBI, some banks may 
be allowed to migrate towards more sophisticated approaches like IRB.  Under the 
revised regime of Basel II, Indian banks will be required to maintain a minimum CRAR 
                                                 
15 Note that the final guidelines from RBI were issued in April 2007, beyond the initial target date of March 
2007, giving some indication of the amount of extra preparation that was required even for the RBI.   10
of 9 per cent on an ongoing basis.  Further, banks are encouraged to achieve a tier I 
CRAR of at least 6 per cent by March 2010.  In order to ensure a smooth transition to 
Basel II, RBI has advised the banks to have a parallel run of the revised norms along with 
the currently applicable norms.   
 
Tables A2 and A3 in Appendix present the RBI’s scheme of risk-weights for different 
categories of assets to be considered for credit risk under SA of Basel II.  For claims in 
Indian rupees, RBI’s guidelines provide risk-weights for direct and guarantee exposures 
of the Central and State governments, exposures to apex bodies such as RBI, Deposit 
Insurance and Credit Guarantee Corporation (DICGC), Credit Guarantee Fund Trust for 
Small Industries (CGTSI) and Export Credit Guarantee Corporation (ECGC), exposures 
to scheduled commercial banks and other banks, and exposures to corporate with various 
credit ratings.  Apart from these, RBI guidelines also deal with claims in retail portfolios, 
claims secured by residential property and claims secured by commercial real estate.  RBI 
has also set extensive guidelines on to how to deal with Non-Performing Assets (NPAs) 
in calculating risk-weighted assets.  As far as claims on foreign currency are concerned, 
RBI has retained the indicative guidelines of Basel Committee, and provided risk weights 
in accordance with the credit ratings of external credit rating agencies (Table A3). 
 
Basel II: Some issues, some challenges 
 
Scholars have drawn attention to certain shortcomings of the original Basel II guidelines, 
on the basis of which individual countries are expected to build their regulatory 
guidelines.  In particular, many scholars have pointed out that linking credit rating to 
regulatory capital standards may have severe macro-economic implications.  As the 
sovereign ratings of developing and emerging countries are not as high as the 
industrialized and the high income countries, this will have an unfavourable effect on the 
credit flows to developing and emerging economies.  Empirical studies have pointed out 
that Basel II may significantly overestimate the risk of international lending to 
developing economies.
16  Further, credit ratings are found to be pro-cyclical (Ferri et al. 
1999, Monfort and Mulder 2000).  Credit rating agencies upgrade sovereigns in times of 
sound market conditions and downgrade in turbulent times.  This can potentially add to 
the dynamics of emerging market crisis.  Bank and corporate ratings in emerging 
countries are linked to their sovereign ratings.  In times of crisis, when the need for credit 
may be imperative, credit flow may diminish due to downgrading of the sovereign (and 
therefore the bank and corporate) ratings by external rating agencies, leading to banking 
crisis, in addition to the currency/balance of payments crisis, what Kaminsky and 
Reinhart (1999) call ‘twin crises’.  This may have severe impact on the macro-economic 
stability.  For example, Ferri et al. (2000) show that during the East Asian currency crisis 
of 1997-98, following Moody’s downgradation of sovereign ratings for Indonesia, Korea 
and Thailand, the corporate ratings were also downgraded sharply in these countries, 
leading to a sharp fall in the international capital flows in the region.  Interestingly, even 
when the sovereign ratings of Korea and Thailand were upgraded in 1999 following the 
macro-economic recovery, corporate ratings continued to remain ‘speculative grade’.   
                                                 
16 See, for example, Griffith-Jones et al. (2004).   11
Further, the study also found that in the short term, the ratings of non-high income 
countries’ banks are more sensitive to changes in their sovereign ratings in a noticeably 
asymmetric manner, i.e. it is more sensitive for sovereign downgrading than sovereign 
upgrading.  Thus, incorporation of external credit ratings into regulatory capital 
requirement may lead to serious macro-economic instability. 
  
While these concerns remain for the Indian economy in general, several issues specific to 
India’s banking system also arise in the wake of the new regime.  In this section, we 
discuss the issues specific to the banking system of India. 
 
RBI risk-weighing scheme 
 
A look at the RBI’s scheme of risk-weighing reveals certain shortcomings.  First, RBI’s 
scheme provides much less risk weights to exposures to scheduled commercial banks 
than exposures to other banks/financial institutions.  To be more precise, exposure to 
scheduled commercial banks with current regulatory level of CRAR will attract a risk-
weight of 20 per cent while exposure to non-scheduled banks/financial institutions with 
same level of CRAR will attract 100 per cent risk-weight.  This is discriminatory not only 
against non-scheduled banks of sound financial health, but also against cooperative banks 
and micro-finance institutions that cater to a large number of urban and rural poor in 
India.  Second, RBI’s scheme encourages borrowers to remain unrated rather than rated 
below a certain level (see Tables A2 and A3 in Appendix).  A rating of B- and below will 
have a higher risk-weight of 150 per cent, while an unrated entity will have a risk-weight 
of 100 per cent.  If borrowers consequently choose to remain unrated, then they would 
receive a risk-weight of 100 per cent under Basel II which is same as under Basel I, thus 
leading to no significant improvement in the risk-weighted asset calculation.   
 
Issues on credit rating industry  
 
As the SA approach of credit risk is dependent on linking risk weights to the credit 
ratings of an external rating agency, credit ratings are being institutionalized into the 
regulatory framework of banking supervision.  This raises four important issues that need 
to be looked into.  These are – the quality of credit rating in India, the level of penetration 
of credit rating, lack of issuer ratings in India and last but not the least, the effect of the 
credit rating scheme on Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) and Small Scale Industry 
(SSI) lending.  In this section we elaborate each of them. 
 
The credit rating industry in India presently consists of four agencies: Credit Rating 
Information Services of India Limited (CRISIL), Investment Information and Credit 
Rating Agency of India (ICRA), Credit Analysis & Research Limited (CARE) and Fitch 
India.
17  These agencies provide credit ratings for different types of debt instruments of 
                                                 
17 CRISIL is the oldest and largest agency, with about 60 per cent of the total market share in 2006.  A 
subsidiary of Standard & Poor’s, CRISIL was incorporated in 1987.  ICRA, an associate of Moody's 
Investors Service, was established in 1991 and CARE was established in 1993.  Fitch Ratings India 
Private Limited, formerly known as Duff & Phelps Credit Rating India Private Ltd. prior to 2001, is a 
wholly-owned subsidiary of the Fitch group that started operating in India since 1996.      12
short and long terms of various corporations.  Very recently, they have also commenced 
credit rating for SMEs.  Apart from that, ICRA and CARE also provide credit rating for 
issuers of debt instruments, including private companies, municipal bodies and State 
governments. 
 
Basel guidelines entrust the national banking supervisors with the responsibility to 
identify credit rating agencies for assessing borrowers.  RBI has recognized all four credit 
rating agencies as eligible for the purposes of risk-weighting banks’ claims for capital 
adequacy.  Further, the following international rating agencies are recognized for risk-
weighing claims on foreign entities: Fitch, Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s (RBI 2007b).  
Further, RBI has recommended the use of only ‘solicited’ ratings.    
 
Credit rating quality:  The literature on India’s credit rating industry is scanty.  However, 
the few studies available point to the low and unsatisfactory quality.  In Gill (2005), 
ICRA’s performance in terms of credit rating and provision of timely and complete 
information on the rated companies has been studied.  Analysing the ICRA ratings for the 
period 1995-2002, the study finds that many of the debt issues that defaulted during the 
period were placed in ICRA’s ‘investment grade’ until just before being dropped to the 
‘default grade’.  These were not gradually downgraded, rather they were suddenly 
dumped into ‘default grade’ at the last moment from an ‘investment grade’ category.  
Further some defaulting issues were continuously reaffirmed as investment grade.  In 
previous studies, Raghunathan and Varma (1992; 1993) evaluated the ratings published 
by CRISIL in India and found that CRISIL ratings not only do not adequately reflect the 
financial ratios of the rated entity, but also are internally inconsistent.  In these studies, 
CRISIL ratings were found to be very liberal by international standards.  For example, 
what CRISIL rated as AAA would usually receive a rating of BBB or lower by 
international standards.  Further, companies rated in the same category by CRISIL 
reflected a wide variety of credit-worthiness, implying the lack of discriminatory power 
of the ratings vis-à-vis the credit-worthiness of the entities in the same rating category.   
 
The literature on credit rating identifies lack of ‘unsolicited’ rating as an important factor 
leading to poor quality of credit rating.
18  In India all ratings are ‘solicited’, i.e.  all 
ratings are paid for by the rated entity.  This creates a conflict of interest on the part of the 
rating agency since it is dependent on the fees of the rated entity for its business.  Thus, 
credit rating industry in India is driven mostly by the rated entities.  Under the present 
system, issuers of bond/debt instruments may go to any number of agencies for a rating 
of their bonds/debt instruments and have the right to accept or reject the rating.  Further, 
the rating cannot be published unless accepted by the issuer.   
 
Thus, while RBI has recognized all four credit rating agencies as eligible for the purpose 
of capital adequacy norm, one is faced with the lack of objective assessment of the 
quality of these agencies.  The few available studies indicate poor track record of the 
credit rating quality in India.  In addition to this, RBI’s recommendation for use of only 
solicited ratings causes some concern, owing to the problem of moral hazard. 
  
                                                 
18 See, for example, Hill (2004)   13
Low penetration of credit rating:  The second important issue in India’s credit rating 
industry is the low penetration of credit rating in India.  A study in 1999 revealed that out 
of 9,640 borrowers enjoying fund-based working capital facilities from banks, only 300 
were rated by major agencies.
19 As far as individual investors are concerned, the level of 
confidence on credit rating in In d i a  i s  v e r y  l o w .   I n  a n  a ll-India survey of investor 
preference in 1997, it was found that about 41.29 per cent of the respondents (out of a 
total number of 2,819 respondents) of all income classes were not aware of any credit 
rating agency in India; and of those who were aware, about 66 per cent had no or low 
confidence in the ratings given by credit rating agencies (Gupta et al. 2001).  The 
legitimacy brought about by Basel II for credit ratings of borrowers will definitely 
increase the penetration of the industry.  However, until such time, most loans will be 
given 100 per cent risk weightage (since an unrated claim gets 100 per cent weightage); 
thus leading to no significant improvement of Basel II over Basel I.   
 
Issuer ratings:  Presently credit rating in India is restricted to ‘issues’ (the instruments) 
rather than to ‘issuers’.  Ratings to issuers become important as the loans by corporate 
bodies and SMEs are to be weighted as per their ratings.  Of late agencies like ICRA and 
CARE have launched issuer ratings for corporations, municipal bodies and the State 
government bodies.  Further, all agencies, with direct support from the Government of 
India, have launched SMEs rating.  Until such efforts pick up rapidly, issuers will be 
assigned 100 per cent weightage, leading to no improvement in the risk-sensitive 
calculation of the loans.  Thus, in this account too, the implementation of Basel II would 
not lead to significant improvement over Basel I.   
 
Effects on SMEs and SSI lending
20:  Besides agriculture and other social sectors, Small 
Scale Industry is treated as a priority lending sector by RBI.
21 SSI accounts for nearly 95 
per cent of industrial units in India, 40 per cent of the total industrial production, 35 per 
cent of the total export and 7 per cent of GDP of India.  In spite of its importance on 
Indian economy, SSI receives only about 10 per cent of bank credit (Table A4 in 
Appendix).  As banking reforms have progressed, credit to SSI has fallen.  The SSI sector 
in India is so far out of the reach of the credit rating industry.  Under the proposed Basel 
II norms, banks will be discouraged to lend to SSI that is not rated because a loan to 
unrated entity will attract 100 per cent risk-weight.  Thus, bank lending to this sector may 
further go down.   
 
In a recent initiative to promote credit rating of SMEs including SSI, the Government of 
India had launched SMEs Rating Agency (SMERA) in September 2005.  It is a joint 
initiative of Small Industries Development Bank of India (SIDBI), Dun and Bradstreet 
Information Services India (D&B), Credit Information Bureau India Limited (CIBIL) and 
                                                 
19 Leeladhar (2005). 
20 Industrial classifications of India are formally divided into Large/Medium industry and Small industry. 
Due to this structure, the term ‘SMEs’ is not defined formally and properly in India. With regard to SSI, 
see Nikaido (2004). 
21 The directed credit for commercial banks was introduced in 1974 and currently banks are asked to 
allocate 40 per cent of their credit to the priority sector.     14
16 major banks in India.  Apart from SMERA, other rating agencies have also launched 
SMEs rating.   
 
As an incentive to get credit rating, Government of India currently provides a subsidy of 
75 per cent of the rating fees to SMEs who get a rating.  Net of this subsidy, the rating 
fees for SMEs with annual turnover of less than Rs. 50 lakh are as follows: Rs. 19,896 for 
a rating by CRISIL, Rs. 19,896 for a rating by ICRA, Rs. 7,400 for a rating by CARE and 
Rs. 22,141 for a rating by Fitch India.  Without the subsidy, the fees are: Rs. 40,000 for 
CRISIL, Rs. 40,000 for ICRA, Rs. 29,600 for CARE and Rs. 42,000 for Fitch India.   
 
According to the Third All India Census of SSI conducted during 2001-02 by the 
Ministry of Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises, average output per unit of SSI in India 
in 2001-02 was about Rs. 4 lakh.
22  Thus, with the subsidy, SSI units will have to spend 
2-5 per cent of their output as fees for credit rating.  Without the subsidy, the percentage 
of fees to output is in the range of 7-11 per cent.  This additional cost of credit rating is 
bound to affect the economic viability of a large number of SSI units.  
  
While introduction of credit rating for the SMEs (including SSIs) may, in the long run, 
improve the accounting practices of the SSI, there is also a possibility that SMEs will 
continue to rely on the existing system of informal credit as formal credit is likely to 




Extensive data requirement: Implementation of Basel II, particularly the advanced 
approaches like the IRB for credit risk and AMA for operational risk would require a 
huge amount of data for model building and validation.  A large number of banks in India 
lack reliable historical data due to late computerization.  Data on losses due to 
‘operational risk’ are currently non-existent.  The lack of good quality historical data on 
credit, market and operational risks may make migration towards the more advanced 
approaches of risk management slow.   
 
Implementation cost:  Basel II will lead to increased level of capital requirements for 
banks due to incorporation of capital charges for operational risk in addition to credit and 
market risks.  According to the recent (April 2007) RBI circular, banks will have to 
increase their tier I capital by about Rs. 512,550 million within March 2009, including 
raising Rs. 455,210 million from the capital market to meet the Basel II requirements of 
increased capital.  These figures were arrived at after conducting a simulation study of 50 
public and private sector banks, consisting of 19 nationalised banks, SBI and its 7 
associates, 7 new private banks and 16 old private sector banks.  Among themselves, the 
19 nationalised banks will have to raise Rs. 212,110 million while the 8 SBI group banks 
will have to raise an estimated Rs. 100,700 million.  The 7 new private banks will have to 
                                                 
22 Ministry of Small Scale Industries was renamed as the Ministry of Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises 
since Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises (MSME) development Act, 2006. See following website: 
http://www.smallindustryindia.com/ssiindia/census/ch8.htm.   15
raise Rs. 160,380 million while the equity requirement of the 16 old private banks has 
been estimated at Rs. 39,360 million.
23    
 
Further, extensive data requirements, upgradation of technical infrastructure, capacity 
building and human resource development will translate into very high implementation 
cost.  A Bank of International Settlements (BIS) observation in 2004 indicated that 
“Asian banks are expected to spend between 7 to 10 per cent of their global IT and 
business operations budget on Basel II compliance for the next four to six years.”
24   
 
The increased capital requirements and the huge implementation costs are likely to pose a 
great challenge in the path of India’s move towards Basel II.  This may in fact trigger a 
round of consolidation in Indian banking industry in the coming years.     
 
5  Observations and Concluding Remarks 
 
In this article, we have attempted to review the capital adequacy regime in India.  In 
particular our focus is on the present state of capital to risk-weighted asset ratios of the 
banking sector.  We have observed that with respect to the current regime of capital 
standards, the Basel I, India’s banking industry is performing reasonably well, with an 
average CRAR of about 12 per cent, which is not only higher than the internationally 
acceptable level of 8 per cent, but also higher than India’s own regulatory requirement of 
9 per cent.   
 
The RBI has announced that the Indian banking sector should implement the revised 
capital adequacy norms, Basel II, by March 2008.  We have discussed the limitations in 
the RBI’s guidelines on Basel II implementation.  Under the Basel II guidelines, the 
credit rating agencies will play a prominent role in determining regulatory risk capital.  
The main concerns are the unsatisfactory performance of the credit rating industry in 
India, the low credit rating penetration and the high costs of credit rating especially for 
SMEs. Further, the increased requirement of tier I capital, the high cost of 
implementation and the requirement of extensive data and software for implementation of 
Basel II will, in our view, pose a major challenge in India’s migration towards Basel II 
regime.  We have argued that if these issues are not tackled up front, then the end result 
would be no different from the current Basel I norms, albeit at higher cost. 
 
Despite these challenges, in a globalizing financial system, India will not be able to do 
away with the recent international developments such as Basel II.  In the long run, 
adherence to Basel II by Indian banks will result in improved accounting, risk 
management and supervisory principles that are in line with internationally accepted best 
practices.  While the Basel II regime provides the credit rating industry with an 
opportunity in terms of business expansion, it needs to be seen if the industry is able to 
perform in terms of the key principles of objectivity, independence, transparency, 
                                                 
23 Business Lines, April 19, 2007. 
24 Basel II Framework and India: Compliance Vs. Opportunity, IBS-IBA Special Report 2004.   16
disclosure, resources and credibility.  We argue that solicited ratings scheme is an 
impediment towards this goal.   
 
Since development of IT infrastructure is very crucial to Basel II implementation, India’s 
growing IT industry is likely to benefit from the increased business opportunities in the 
long run.  Processes such as data analysis, model building and model validation are likely 
to be outsourced to the BPO (Business Process Outsourcing) sector, increasing the role of 
by now mature BPO industry in India.  Thus, in the long run, adherence to Basel II 
regime is expected to benefit not only the banking industry, but also several other sectors 
of Indian economy, such as the credit rating industry, the IT industry and the BPO 
industry.   17
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Table A 1: Risk weights of asset categories under Basel I 
 
Risk weight  Asset category (on-balance-sheet asset) 
Cash 
Claims on central govts. and central banks denominated in national 
currency and funded in that currency 
Other claims on OECD central govts. and central banks 
0% 
Claims collateralised by cash of OECD centrral govts. securities or 
guranteed by OECD central govts 
10,20 or 





Claims on domestic public sector entities, excluding central govt, and 
loans guranteed by or collateralised by securities issues by such entities 
Claims on multilateral development banks and claims guranteed by or 
collateralised by securities issued by such banks 
Claims on banks incorporated in the OECD and claims guranteed by 
OECD incorporated banks 
Claims on securities firms incorporated in the OECD subject to 
comparable supervisory and regulatory arrangements. 
Claims on banks incorporated in countries outside the OECD with a 
residual maturity upto one year and claims with a residual maturity of up 
to one year guranteed by banks incorporated in countries outside the 
OECD 
Claims on non-domestic OECD public sector entities, excluding central 
govts; and claims guranteed by or collateralised by securities issued by 
such entities 
20% 
Cash items in process of collection 
50%  Loans fully secured by mortgage on residential property that is or will be 
occupied by the borrower or that is rented 
Claims to private sector 
Claims on banks incorporated outside the OECD with a residual maturity 
of over one year 
Claims on central governments outside the OECD (unless denominated 
in the national currency and funded in that currency) 
Claims on commercial companies owned by the public sector 
Premises, plant and equipment and other fixed assets 
Real estate and other investments 
Capital instruments issued by other banks 
100% 
All other assets 
 
Source: BIS (1988), Basel Capital Accord, Updated to April 1998 
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Table A 2: RBI's Risk-weights for SA of Basel II: Claims on Indian Entities 
 
Category  Risk 
Weights (%)
Sovereigns    
Central Govt. (direct and guarantee)  0 
State Govt. (direct exposure)  0 
State Govt. (guarantee exposure)  20 
Reserve Bank of India  0 
Deposit Insurance and Credit Guarantee Corporation  0 
Credit Guarantee Fund Trust for Small Industries  0 
Export Credit Guarantee Corporation  20 
Schedule Commercial Banks with CRAR (%) level    
>= 9  20 
6 to < 9  50 
3 to <6  100 
0 to < 3  150 
negative 625 
Other Banks with CRAR (%) level    
>= 9  100 
6 to < 9  150 
3 to <6  250 
0 to < 3  350 
negative 625 
Corporates: Long term (L.T.) and short term (S. T.)    
L. T. Rated: AAA and S.T. Rated: PR1+, P1+, F1+, A1+   20 
L.T. Rated : AA and S.T. Rated: PR1,P1,F1,A1  30 
L. T. Rated A and S. T. Rated PR2, P2, F2, A2  50 
L. T. BBB and S.T. Rated PR3, P3, F3, A3  100 
L.T. Rated BB & below and S.T. Rated PR4,PR5, 
P4,P5,B,C,D,A4,A5 150 
Unrated 100 
Regulatory retail portfolio  75 
Loans secured by residential property     
Upto Rs. 20 lakh  50 
Rs. 20 lakh and above  75 
Commercial real estate exposure  150 
NPAs with specific provision of    
< 20% of outstanding amount  150 
>= 20% of outstanding amount  100 
>= 50% of outstanding amount  50 
Banks' own staff    
covered by superannuation benefit/ mortgage of house  20 
otherwise 75 
Personal loans and credit card receivables  125 
Capital market exposure  125 
All other assets  100 
 
Source: RBI (2007b)   22
 
 
Table A 3: RBI’s Risk-weights for SA of Basel II: Claims on Foreign Entities 
 
Credit Rate  Risk Weight 
S&P/Fitch Moody's  Sovereign  Corporates 
and PSEs  Banks 
AAA to AA-  Aaa to Aa  0  20  20 
A+ to A_  A   20  50  50 
BBB+ to BBB-  Baa  50  100  50 
BB+ to B-  Ba to B  100  100 
Below B -  Below B  150 
150 
150 
Unrated Unrated 100  100  100 
Claims on BIS, IMF, World Bank, IMF, ADB etc.  20 
 
Source: RBI (2007b) 
 
 
Table A 4: Priority sector lending by Scheduled Commercial Banks (SCB) 
(Unit: % to net bank credit) 
SCB  Target  1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006* 
Priority Sector  36.6   37.8  41.7  41.8  39.2 40.2 43.7 43.1    41.2   43.6  42.8  40.3  Public 
Sector 
Banks  SSI  15.3    16.0 16.6 17.5 16.1 14.6 14.2 12.5    10.8    10.4  9.5  8.1 
Priority  Sector  n.a 34.0 41.2 40.9 38.0 38.2 40.9 40.9    44.4    47.3 43.6  42.8  Private 
Sector 
Banks  SSI  n.a 18.8 22.2 20.6 16.5 14.4 13.7 13.7    8.2    7.3  5.4  4.2 
Note:  *  provisional              
 
Source: RBI, Report on Trend and Progress of Banking in India, various issues. 
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